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PUBLIC INTERVENTION IN ADMINISTRATIVE LICENSING
AND THE BURDEN OF PROOF
By GERALD W. GRANDEY*
INTRODUCTION
Governmental licensing of private developments such as
broadcasting stations and power production facilities is not a new
phenomenon; nor is public intervention into those proceedings.
Given this background one would think that a rational, well-
settled approach toward the allocation of the burdens of proof
between the applicant and intervenor would have been devel-
oped. Unfortunately such is not the case. In the almost 100-year
history of administrative law neither the agencies themselves nor
reviewing judicial bodies have been able to agree upon an alloca-
tion which achieves the proper balance between fairness to all
parties and administrative efficiency.
This article begins with the assumption that the public inter-
venor has already been admitted as a party to the licensing pro-
ceeding-a status which is not always easily attained. Once the
obstacle of admittance has been hurdled, the applicant and inter-
venor each raise those issues they wish considered. The agency
must then decide which party will present evidence first and who
will have the ultimate burden of proof with respect to the various
issues presented.
This article will focus primarily upon present practice before
the Atomic Energy Commission. The sheer number of adminis-
trative agencies precludes an inclusive overview. The wealth of
experience reflected in the practice before other agencies, how-
ever, will not be ignored. The AEC was chosen because it provides
a topical example of the difficulties a federal agency faces when
it is confronted by an intervenor intending to oppose the grant of
a license.
* Associate, Holland & Hart, Denver, Colorado; Professional Engineer, Geophysical
Engineering, 1968, Colorado School of Mines; J.D., 1973, Northwestern University.
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The Atomic Energy Act of 1954' was enacted to encourage,
among other things, the development and utilization of atomic
energy for peaceful purposes.' Normally such development and
utilization would be left to the private sector in accordance with
the theories of a capitalistic economy. But because of the hazard-
ous nature of the source, byproduct, and special nuclear material,
Congress determined that it was in the national interest to regu-
late not only the material, but also the facilities using the mate-
rial." Pursuant to this determination, a Commission was estab-
lished and given the authority to regulate the use of atomic en-
ergy.' Concomitantly it was empowered to issue licenses to quali-
fied persons who made application to construct and operate com-
mercial nuclear power reactors.5
Under provisions of the Act an application must be in writing
and contain sufficient information to permit the Commission to
make a determination that the utilization of the nuclear material
will be consonant with the common defense and provide adequate
protection to the health and safety of the people.' Thus utilization
of nuclear fuel is not a fundamental right, but rather a privilege
specifically granted by statute to a qualified applicant.
Once the Commission receives an application for the con-
struction or operation of a nuclear facility it is under a statutory
duty to make findings with respect to the applicant's technical
qualifications; the impact of the reactor's location, design, and
operation upon the public's health and safety;' and the deleter-
ious effects, if any, of the facility's presence and operation upon
the environment2 To resolve these issues public hearings are held
upon the request of any person whose interest may be affected by
the grant of an application. 9 Any person demonstrating the requi-
site interest is entitled to be admitted to the proceeding as a
party. "'
142 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2296 (1970).
'Id. § 2013(d).






'Actually, the licensing of a commercial facility involves two stages: (1) a mandatory
construction licensing hearing, and (2) a post-construction operational licensing hearing
upon the request of an interested person.
"'42 U.S.C. § 2239(a) (1970).
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Recently, as the number of applications for nuclear facilities
has proliferated, members of communities affected by the pro-
posed facility have sought to intervene in the proceedings as in-
terested parties. Primarily their purposes have been to represent
and protect their own health and safety and to preserve the en-
dangered local environment. On several occasions the Commis-
sion has permitted organizations and citizens representing the
public interest in this way to intervene to the extent that they
were able to raise reasonably specific allegations about the facil-
ity and furnish a factual basis for their contentions."
When an interested person successfully intervenes he does so
on the basis of the contentions that he raises in his petition.
During the prehearing phase these contentions are frequently
amended and revised and in some cases satisfactorily answered
by the applicant or the Commission. Those contentions remain-
ing are presented to the licensing board'2 which then decides
whether they are meritorious enough to become issues in the li-
censing hearing. Depending upon the success of prehearing nego-
tiations between the Commission and the applicant, the staff
may or may not have issues of its own to raise.
Under the Act the Commission is obligated to consider the
issues and make findings with respect to the public and national
interest." In this regard all parties, including intervenors, may
present evidence relevant to the issues, but the Act is silent as to
which party must bear the burden of convincing the Commission.
Inevitably the question arises whether the applicant must prove
the facility "safe" with respect to each issue or whether the staff
or intervenor must prove the plant "unsafe." The allocation of the
burden of proof is especially sensitive with regard to the inter-
venor's contentions.
Conceivably the apportionment of this burden could be
made in several ways. The applicant could bear the burden exclu-
sively, or, alternatively, the onus could be imposed solely upon
the intervenor. The burden could be shared between the appli-
cant and the intervenor, each having the responsibility to present
direct evidence on the issues, with the ultimate burden of per-
suading the licensing board imposed on either the applicant or
"iO C.F.R. § 2.714 (1973).
1242 U.S.C. § 2241 (1973).
"Id. § 2133 (1970).
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the intervenor depending upon the issue. Alternatively, the Com-
mission could adopt a policy of indifference to the burden, decid-
ing that its distribution is immaterial and directing all parties to
present their direct evidence. The board would then balance the
evidence and make its determination in accordance with the pub-
lic interest.
Further complications arise when the order in which the par-
ties present their case is considered. The applicant, the staff, or
the intervenor could be directed to proceed first, which in itself
would be a de facto determination that that party has some bur-
den. Alternatively, all parties could be ordered to produce their
direct testimony simultaneously by filing it in written form. Such
a procedure likewise would be tantamount to a determination
that all parties have some burden to sustain, as no party is then
able to prevail merely by controverting his opponent's prima facie
case.
This inquiry will proceed with a brief examination of the
allocation of the burdens of proof in the context of civil litigation,
specifically for the purpose of identifying certain underlying con-
cepts. Once identified these concepts will be analyzed in an ab-
stract setting in order to ascertain if some useful generalizations
can be derived. The concepts and generalizations will then be
tested against legislation applicable to atomic energy licensing,
against procedures of other federal agencies, and against the
needs of the Atomic Energy Commission. Ultimately a determi-
nation will be made of the optimal apportionment of the burden
of proof for purposes of nuclear power plant licensing.
I. CONCEPTS DERIVED FROM CIVIL LITIGATION
Before embarking upon a full analysis of the proper alloca-
tion of the burden of proof in administrative practice, it is desira-
ble to explore some fundamental concepts developed in the con-
text of civil litigation. In normal two-party civil litigation where
a plaintiff and defendant appear before a judge with or without
a jury, the distribution of the burden of proof is, in most instan-
ces, well settled. The plaintiff, as the initiator of the action or the
proponent of an affirmative order, bears the risk of failing to
persuade the jury that his cause is just. This risk is frequently
called the "risk of non-persuasion," for if the plaintiff fails to
present persuasive evidence he loses. 4 Having the risk of nonper-
"9 J. WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS
AT COMMON LAW § 2485 (3d ed. 1940) [hereinafter cited as WIGMORE].
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suasion, the plaintiff is naturally the one upon whom falls the
initial duty of going forward with evidence. If he fails to do this,
the jury can take no action and the defendant-opponent need not
adduce evidence at all. 5 However, if the proponent produces suf-
ficient evidence to persuade a jury of reasonable men that his
action has merit, the burden of presenting evidence shifts to the
opponent. The plaintiff's burden of going forward is met, and the
defendant, if he wishes to prevail, must now sway the jury with
evidence of his own.
6
There are several ways by which a plaintiff can successfully
carry his initial burden of "going forward" and pass the burden
to the defendant. He may obtain a specific ruling from the judge
upon the particular evidence, or invoke an appropriate presump-
tion, or ask that a matter be judicially noticed. But because the
plaintiff's evidence is subject to attack by the cross-examining
opponent, the transition point is not automatically surmounted
by perfunctorily presenting evidence. If the defendant can suffi-
ciently weaken the credibility of the proponent's evidence so that
it is unpersuasive to the jurors, then the plaintiff has failed to
sustain his burden.
Moreover, just because the plaintiff succeeds in meeting his
burden of going forward does not guarantee his ultimate success
in the case. The risk of nonpersuasion is always on the proponent,
and if the defendant adduces evidence sufficiently rebutting the
plaintiff's evidence, the jury is to render its decision accordingly.
Specific legal consequences follow from meeting or failing to
meet the evidentiary requirements. If the plaintiff fails to carry
his burden of going forward, either because it was insufficient on
its face or inadequate under the onslaught of cross-examination,
the judge may properly direct a verdict for the defendant. Simi-
larly, if the plaintiff succeeds in going forward and the defendant
responds with no evidence, the judge may properly direct a ver-
dict for the plaintiff. Evidence, which, if unanswered, would jus-
tify men of ordinary reason and fairness in affirming the claim
which the plaintiff asserts, establishes what is often referred to
as a prima facie case. If such evidence is not rebutted it may
result in a directed verdict; moreover, even if rebutted, it entitles
the plaintiff to have his case considered by the jury."
15/d. § 2487.
1"d. § 2487(c).
7 Id. § 2494.
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II. ALLOCATION OF THE BURDENS OF PROOF IN THE ABSTRACT
Although the foregoing provides a basis for analysis, it is
couched in the context of civil litigation which, though similar in
many respects, is not identical to an administrative licensing
hearing. The typical administrative hearing involves as partici-
pants at least an applicant and the regulatory staff, who in the
normal course of regulation will have resolved their disagree-
ments in advance. With intervention, contested issues arise and
the number of parties to the proceeding increases to three or
more, correspondingly increasing the complexity of the adversary
relationships. More fundamentally, in civil litigation the judge
assumes the role of an impartial arbiter, a servant of justice only,
whereas in an administrative hearing a licensing board is charged
with the affirmative duty of pursuing and protecting the public
interest.' This latter distinction is a significant determinant in a
licensing board's perception of evidentiary matters.
Since civil litigation is not exactly analogous, it is perhaps
better to see if evidentiary rules governing the allocation of the
burdens of proof can be developed in the abstract given certain
axioms.
As in civil actions, the proponent of an administrative rule
or order still should bear the risk of nonpersuasion. The question
is how that proponent is identified. One way would be to engage
in a semantic game in which identification of the proponent turns
upon the positive or negative of the question, e.g., the applicant
is a proponent of an order granting a license, or the intervenor is
a proponent of an order denying the granting of a license. Wig-
more eschewed this approach and turned instead to the pleadings
or applicable rules to distinguish the ultimate facts-the facta
probanda-in the case. 9 Whoever had to prove these facts bore
the risk of nonpersuasion and was therefore the proponent. In the
final analysis it is the language of the pleadings and the applica-
ble rules which determine the proponent and the imposition of
the risk.
As to the burden of going forward with evidence Wigmore
made the assumption that it naturally fell on the party having
the risk of nonpersuasion since, without evidence, the trier of fact
"Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf. v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied,
384 U.S. 941 (1966).
"'9 WIGMORE § 2485.
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could properly take no favorable action at all and there would be
no need for the opponent to adduce evidence.2 ' While this as-
sumption may be valid in civil litigation, it is not axiomatic in
an abstract sense, nor necessarily applicable to administrative
hearings. The burden of going forward could be imposed upon the
opponent, with his failure to maintain the burden neutralizing his
opposition but not necessarily insuring the victory of the propo-
nent. Placement of this burden is indeterminate in the abstract
and ultimately depends upon not only the pleadings and applica-
ble rules of practice, but also upon broad considerations of
policy.,'
Before turning to statutes and regulations pertinent to at-
omic energy licensing hearings, one further observation by Wig-
more is germane to the abstract model. In special situations "the
burden of proving a fact is . . put on the party who presumably
has peculiar means of knowledge enabling him to prove its falsity
if it is false."22
III. ALLOCATION OF THE RISK OF NONPERSUASION AND THE BURDEN
OF GOING FORWARD: AEC LICENSING PROCEEDINGS
The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 has no provision explicitly
addressing the apportionment of the burden of proof in licensing
hearings. :' It does require an applicant for an operating license to
state in its application technical specifications of the nuclear
material, specific characteristics of the facility, and other inforL
mation which will enable the Commission to find that the utiliza-
tion of the nuclear material will be in accord with the common
defense and security and will provide adequate protection to the
health and safety of the public.2 Other evidence is implicitly
called for where the statute requires the Commission to make
findings and issue licenses to applicants
(1) whose proposed activities will serve a useful purpose propor-
tionate to the quantities of special nuclear material or source mate-
rial to be utilized;
(2) who are equipped to observe and who agree to observe such
2"Id. § 2487.
"Cf. id. § 2488(a).
2Id. § 2486 (italics deleted). Wigmore observed that: "This principle had received
frequent application in modern statutes making it an offense to pursue a certain occupa-
tion without a State license .... " Id.
242 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2296 (1970).
211d. § 2232(a); 10 C.F.R. §§ 50.30-38, .55a, .110, Apps. A-F (1974).
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safety standards to protect health and to minimize danger to life or
property as the Commission may by rule establish; and
(3) who agree to make available to the Commission such technical
information and data concerning activities under such licenses as
the Commission may determine necessary to promote the common
defense and security and to protect the health and safety of the
public.
2 15
Regulations of the Atomic Energy Commission require additional
showings by the applicant which will permit the Commission to
find that:
(1) Construction of the facility has been substantially completed,
in conformity with the construction permit and the application as
amended, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations
of the Commission; and
(2) The facility will operate in conformity with the application as
amended, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations
of the Commission; and
(3) There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized
by the operating license can be conducted without endangering the
health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be
conducted in compliance with the regulations in this chapter; and
(4) The applicant is technically and financially qualified to engage
in the activities authorized by the operating license in accordance
with the regulations in this chapter; and
(5) The applicable provisions of Part 140 of this chapter have been
satisfied; and
(6) The issuance of the license will not be inimical to the common
defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
2 6
In essence the foregoing findings of fact to be made by the licens-
ing board are the ultimate facts or facta probanda which must be
proved at the hearing. Analysis of the language reveals that the
findings are positively stated necessitating proof of compliance
with applicable standards, safety, utility, technical ability, and
financial qualification. Thus the risk of nonpersuasion is on the
person who must satisfy the commission with respect to the requi-
site findings-namely the applicant.27 This conclusion follows ir-
respective of the origin of the issues so long as they relate to the
ultimate facts to be proved.
2:42 U.S.C. § 2133(b) (1970).
2 10 C.F.R. § 50.57 (1973). Similar conditions are imposed for construction permits.
Id. §§ 50.55-.55a.
2The opponent would normally phrase his allegations in terms of unsafeness, non-
compliance, technical inability, and financial unqualification. If the ultimate facts were
likewise stated in the negative, i.e., a license will be denied if a facility is found to be
unsafe, etc., then the opponent would bear the risk of nonpersuasion.
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As in the abstract model, imposition of the risk of nonpersua-
sion is not necessarily dispositive of the assignment of the burden
of going forward on the issues in an administrative hearing. The
intervenor-opponent still may have some burden of going forward
in regard to contentions that he raises even though they relate to
the ultimate facts to be proved in the proceeding.
The Commission complicates the problem with an ambigu-
ous regulation. Section 2.732 provides that: "Unless otherwise
ordered by the presiding officer the applicant or the proponent of
an order has the burden of proof."2" The regulation speaks gener-
ally of the burden of proof and arguably could include both the
risk of nonpersuasion and the burden of going forward with evi-
dence. If so, the applicant, as the proponent of an order, would
suffer both burdens. More likely, however, the regulation merely
addresses the ultimate burden in a proceeding-the risk of non-
persuasion-leaving the allocation of the burden of going forward
undecided. In addition, even though analysis of the Act has led
to the conclusion that the applicant should have the risk of non-
persuasion, under the regulation, the presiding officer may decide
otherwise. No standards or criteria are enumerated under which
the decision to shift the burden of proof is to be made.
The clause conferring such discretion upon the presiding offi-
cer may have no force and effect whatsoever because it appar-
ently conflicts with the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)
which is incorporated by reference into the Atomic Energy Act."8
Referring to administrative hearings, section 7(c) of the APA
states that "except as otherwise provided by statute the propo-
nent of a rule or order has the burden of proof."30 Since the regula-
tion is not a "statute" within the meaning of section 7(c), the
Commission's attempt, absent authority under the Atomic En-
ergy Act, to give the presiding officer some discretion in assigning
the risk of nonpersuasion is without effect. But even if the exer-
cise of discretion with regard to the risk of nonpersuasion is pre-
vented by section 7(c) of the APA, that prohibition may not be
dispositive of the ability of a presiding officer to exercise discre-
tion with regard to the burden of going forward.
Section 7(c) uses the familiar language that "the proponent
of a rule or order has the burden of proof," which thus far has
"10 C.F.R. § 2.732 (1973).
-42 U.S.C. § 2231 (1970).
: 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (1970).
1974
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failed to yield a hint as to the apportionment of the burden of
going forward. Both the House and Senate reports explained the
provision in the following language:
That the proponent of a rule or order has the burden of proof means
not only that the party initiating the proceeding has the general
burden of coming forward with a prima facie case but that other
parties, who are proponents of some different result, also for that
purpose have a burden to maintain. Similarly the requirement that
no sanction be imposed or rule or order be issued except upon evi-
dence of the kind specified means that the proponents of a denial
of relief must sustain such denial by that kind of evidence. For
example, credible and credited evidence submitted by the applicant
for a license may not be ignored except upon the requisite kind and
quality of contrary evidence. No agency is authorized to stand mute
and arbitrarily disbelieve credible evidence. Except as applicants
for a license or other privilege may be required to come forward with
a prima facie showing, no agency is entitled to presume that the
conduct of any person or status of any enterprise is unlawful or
improper."
The House Report went on to say:
In other words, this section means that every proponent of a rule or
order or the denial thereof has the burden of coming forward with
sufficient evidence therefor; and in determining applications for li-
censes or other relief any fact, conduct, or status so shown by credi-
ble and credited evidence must be accepted as true except as the
contrary has been shown or such evidence has been rebutted or
impeached by duly credited evidence or by facts officially noticed
and stated.2
Based upon this interpretation the applicant for a nuclear facility
license apparently would have the burden of going forward with
sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case. Sufficient evi-
dence means that there are facts in evidence which if unanswered
would justify the licensing board, as men of ordinary reason and
fairness, in granting the license which the applicant seeks.
3
1
The language of the report would seem to be conclusive with
respect to the applicant's burden of going forward on all issues
whether raised by the Commission or the opponents, if it were not
for the phrase that "proponents of some different result, also...
have a burden to maintain." The phrase is capable of supporting
two inferences. Conceivably it could mean that the intervenor-
:'H.R. REP. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 36 (1946); S. REP. No. 752, 79th Cong.,
1st Sess. 22 (1945).
32H.R. REP. No. 1980, supra note 31, at 36.
*:9 WIGMORE § 2494.
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opponent has a burden of going forward regardless of the issues
being raised; or it could signify that the intervenor has the burden
only with respect to the affirmative issues that he raises, and as
to those issues on which the Act requires the applicant to present
evidence, the intervenor need only rebut the applicant's prima
facie case.
Practice in civil litigation demonstrates the unacceptability
of the first possibility. The civil defendant, if he wishes to prevail
following presentation of a prima facie case by the plaintiff, must
come forward with evidence sufficient to rebut the plaintiffs evi-
dence and sway the jury. 4 Only insofar as the plaintiff is able to
establish credible and credited evidence does the defendant have
a burden to maintain. A similar result in the conduct of adminis-
trative proceedings seems to be contemplated by both reports
noted above. While credible and credited evidence put forward by
the applicant cannot be ignored or disbelieved by the agency
unless the opponent of a licensing privilege offers commensurate
evidence in rebuttal, only if the applicant has presented such a
prima facie case do the opponents have a burden to sustain. If,
instead, the applicant's evidence is impeached by cross-
examination and a prima facie case is not established, the license
cannot be granted and the opponents have no burden to sustain
at all.
The second inference which may be drawn from the language
of the reports is that the intervenor-opponent may have to main-
tain a burden of going forward with respect to those issues which
he raises and need only rebut or impeach the evidence which the
Act requires the applicant put forth.
If, on the one hand, the issues relate to the ultimate issues
to be proved prior to granting a license, then the applicant should
initially bear both the risk of nonpersuasion and the burden of
going forward. For example, where the intervenor merely asserts
that the applicant is not financially qualified or that a portion of
the facility is unsafe, it is clear that the applicant, to establish
its prima facie case, must present evidence on such issues ir-
respective of the intervenor's contention." In essence, when the
"Id. § 2487(c).
' For example, if the ultimate issue is the safety of a nuclear facility, then the appli-
cant, to establish a prima facie case, must come forward with credible evidence as to all
safety considerations and issues including, but not limited to, safety issues raised by
1974
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opponent raises such issues, he is doing nothing more than put-
ting the respective parties on notice that he does not believe that
the applicant can present credible evidence with respect to the
issue and that, if the applicant does, he is prepared to rebut with
evidence of his own. The applicant, once notified of the inter-
venor's issues, can establish his prima facie case as to aspects
outside the opponent's issues confident that such evidence will go
unchallenged by the opponent.
A different result probably should be reached when the inter-
venor's issues fall outside the sphere of or do not relate to the
ultimate issues before the board. Hence when the intervenor al-
leges unlawful or improper conduct on the part of an applicant,
unless the statute requires a prima facie showing to the contrary
by the applicant, the burden of going forward should be on the
intervenor. In fact, both the House and Senate reports contem-
plated just such a result."
In summary, after having looked at the pleadings and applic-
able rules of practice, one must reach the conclusion that the
Atomic Energy Act, the APA, and the Commission's regulations
all require that the risk of nonpersuasion be borne by the appli-
cant. Less certain is the allocation of the burden of going forward;
however, the legislative history of the APA strongly suggests that
at least with respect to those issues relating to the facta probanda
the applicant should also bear this responsibility. As to issues not
relating to the ultimate facts, the burden of going forward should
rest with the intervenor.
IV. ALLOCATION OF THE BURDEN OF GOING FORWARD
IN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS
To fully develop and explore considerations of policy in the
atomic energy licensing field, an understanding of the practice
and experience in other federal administrative bodies is essential.
In doing so at least one caveat should be noted. Administrative
procedure is variable and molded to the function of the agency.
Consequently, procedures of dissimilar agencies will differ. The
Atomic Energy Commission in particular seems to be unique
among the federal agencies. The subject matter of its regulatory
opponents. The agency should not depend upon opponents to raise important issues of fact
necessary to support affirmative findings. Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Comm. v. AEC, 449
F.2d 1109, 1118-19 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
:"See text accompanying note 33 supra.
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responsibilities is complex and technical, with regulation requir-
ing a high degree of scientific sophistication. Most of the informa-
tion relevant to its regulatory decisions is exclusively in the hands
of the applicant or the Commission. The public in general does
not understand the information and hence does not accumulate
it. Furthermore, nuclear energy is inherently dangerous with awe-
some consequences if exploitation ignores considerations of
safety. For these reasons the procedure of another agency must
be carefully examined before applying it to the AEC arena.
A cursory analysis of procedures in various federal agencies
leads to the conclusion that there is an unsystematized approach
toward apportionment of the burdens of proof. A more thorough
analysis reveals that while there may be some functional justifi-
cation for disparate treatment, there remains an inexplicable
degree of difference among the several agencies when making the
allocation.:"
To reiterate there are basically three approaches an agency
can take toward the allocation. First, it may determine that,
although the applicant has the risk of nonpersuasion, the
intervenor-opponent bears at least some burden of going forward
with evidence. Second, the agency may decide that the applicant
has both the risk of nonpersuasion and the burden of going for-
ward on all issues. Finally, the agency may conclude that in ad-
ministrative hearings it is largely immaterial which party has the
burden of going forward though the applicant bears the risk of
nonpersuasion. Judicial and administrative bodies have failed to
settle upon a uniform approach; therefore, it is necessary to ex-
plore fully each alternative.
A. Burden of Going Forward on Intervenor-Opponent
The leading case imposing a burden of going forward on the
intervenor-opponents is Office of Communication of the United
Church of Christ v. FCC." Familiarity with the decision's long
:"It should be noted that there is a fundamental distinction in administrative law
between proceedings initiated by the agency and proceedings initiated by an applicant.
In the former the agency is usually attempting to enforce a regulation or take some
remedial action against a party and therefore has at least the initial burden of going
forward and, in most instances, the risk of nonpersuasion. It is the latter variety which
concerns this paper although occasional reference will be made to agency initiated actions
for purpose of comparison. The distinction is logical and comports with section 556(d) of
the APA since, in an enforcement proceeding, the agency is the proponent of a rule or
order. 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (1970).
-425 F.2d 543 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
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DENVER LAW JOURNAL
and complex history is essential to the understanding of the
court's distribution of the burdens of proof. An earlier opinion of
the District of Columbia Court of Appeals dealing with the same
controversy directed that individuals and organizations repre-
senting the applicant's listening public be permitted to intervene
and participate :" in the Federal Communication Commission's
license renewal hearing. The prospective intervenors sought a
hearing, contending that the applicant had willfully practiced
racial discrimination and had knowingly violated the fairness
doctrine.
On remand the Commission ruled that the applicant had the
burden of proof on the ultimate issue of whether renewal of its
license would serve the public interest, convenience, or necessity,
but that the Church of Christ and other intervenors had the bur-
den, including the risk of nonpersuasion, of proving violation of
the fairness doctrine and discrimination against significant
groups within the community of the applicant's service area.10
The Commission's allocation being unacceptable, the intervenors
petitioned for reconsideration and sought an order assigning the
ultimate burden of proof upon all the issues to the applicant.'
Intervenors justified their request because the applicant knew the
most about the facts, and because otherwise the burden of proof
on the ultimate issue would be meaningless. 2 It is important to
note that the intervenors desired to impose only the risk of non-
persuasion on the applicants while they were content to carry the
burden of going forward themselves. 3 Even with this concession
the Commission rejected the proposed allocations on the ground
that:
The issues involved in this proceeding are based upon the
charges made by intervenors and relate largely to acts of omission
rather than commission .... Those who allege such discrimination
are in at least as good a position as the applicant to know the facts
relating to it....
... In essence, the hearing order . . .merely requires that those
making specific accusations shall come forward with their evidence
and afford the one accused an opportunity to reply after he is fully
informed of the charges and the evidence."
-1359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
'"Lamar Life Broadcasting Co., 3 F.C.C.2d 784 (1966).
"Lamar Life Ins. Co., 20 Ad. L. Dec. 2d 92 (F.C.C. 1966).
"Id. at 94.
"Lamar Life Broadcasting Co., 14 F.C.C.2d 431, 433 n.8 (1968).




It is evident that the Commission fell into the semantic trap of
positives and negatives and made an incorrect analogy to cases
involving charges of criminal conduct.45
Intervenors, in making their argument, had relied upon two
earlier FCC cases involving serious allegations of misconduct
raised in an opponent's petition to deny a license. In both cases
the Commission ruled that the intervenor was to proceed with the
initial introduction of evidence on the issue even though the ap-
plicant had the ultimate burden of proof.4" In its decision concern-
ing the burden to be placed on Church of Christ the Commission
gave little attention to the two earlier cases, stating that in those
cases the rationale for splitting the ultimate burden of proof from
the burden of first proceeding with evidence was that the facts in
issue were peculiarly within the knowledge of the applicant.47 The
Commission then issued an order renewing the broadcaster's li-
cense and noting that the intervenors had failed to come forward
and sustain their serious allegations against the applicant."
On appeal the circuit court vacated the order and held that
the Commission had gravely misunderstood the role of the inter-
venors as well as the allocation of the burden of proof.49 The court
held that the applicant has the ultimate burden of proof on all
the issues and that:
The failure to present particular viewpoints and the failure to provide the
opportunity for expression by significant community groups may be better
known to those claiming to represent the viewpoints of groups denied access
to broadcast facilities than to the broadcaster who keeps records of what he
has presented rather than what he has not presented.
Id. at 95.
'"See 10 C.F.R. § 2.732 (1973) and dissenting statement of Commissioner Cox in
Lamar Life Ins. Co., 20 Ad. L. Dec. 2d 92 (F.C.C. 1966). See also 9 WIGMORE § 2488(a).
The Commission cited as precedent for its allocation of the burden of proof D & E Broad-
casting Co., 1 F.C.C.2d 78 (1965), which involved a charge that the applicant had violated
the law by smuggling horses into the United States from Mexico. The Commission ruled
that where an issue involving serious misconduct has been raised, the party making the
charges has not only the burden of going forward with the evidence, but the ultimate
burden of proof as well.
"Elyria-Lorain Broadcasting Co., 6 R.R.2d 191 (1965); Washington Broadcasting Co.,
3 F.C.C.2d 777 (1966). In the latter opinion the Commission stated that placement of the
burden of going forward upon the intervenor was in accord with concepts of basic fairness.
However, the Commission also explicated that the purpose of so placing the burden was
to delineate the facts in issue and to inform the applicant of precise factual issues to be
resolved.
'17See Lamar Life Ins. Co., 20 Ad. L. Dec. 2d 92 (F.C.C. 1966).
"Lamar Life Broadcasting Co., 14 F.C.C.2d 495, 549 (1967).
"Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 425 F.2d 543 (D.C.
Cir. 1969).
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We did not intend that intervenors representing a public interest be
treated as interlopers. Rather ... a "Public Intervenor" who is
seeking no license or private right is, in this context, more nearly like
a complaining witness who presents t vidence to police or a prosecu-
tor whose duty it is to conduct an affirmative and objective investi-
gation of all the facts and to pursue his prosecutorial or regulatory
function if there is probable cause to believe a violation has oc-
curred .5
The court's opinion is dispositive of the allocation of the
ultimate burden-the risk of nonpersuasion. But since the inter-
venors had assumed from the beginning that the burden of going
forward with respect to their contentions was on them, the assign-
ment of the burden of going forward was never decided. In dic-
tum, however, the court concluded that the intervenors did have
to sustain a burden of going forward. Judge, now Chief Justice,
Burger, writing for the majority, analogized to the situation where
a complaining witness must present evidence before a prosecutor
will act. In a footnote to the analogy the court approvingly re-
ferred to a memorandum statement prepared by it in denying
intervenors' motion for clarification of the earlier Church of
Christ opinion.51 In that statement the court impliedly sanctioned
imposition of the burden of going forward on intervenors by mak-
ing the assumption that the Commission's reference to the bur-
den of proof with respect to issues raised by intervenors was in-
tended to mean "only the burden of going forward with evidence
in the first instance."
5 2
In short, the Church of Christ court assumed, but did not
decide, that the intervenors had a burden of going forward with
respect to the issues raised by them. The validity of this assump-
tion is questionable. The court regarded the public intervenors as
complaining witnesses. Without a doubt they were; but they were
not complaining of criminal misconduct to a prosecutor as in the
court's analogy; rather they were complaining of a violation of
public trust by the applicant to an agency established to protect
the public interest. In a criminal complaint, where probable
cause is required before action can be taken, a complainant must
certainly come forward with some evidence. Whether a public
interest organization making allegations similar to the ones made
5 ld. at 546.





by the Church of Christ must initially present evidence should
depend upon the applicable statute, rules of practice, and consid-
erations of policy. ' :'
If the applicant had an affirmative duty under the Commu-
nication Act or FCC regulations to demonstrate compliance with
the fairness doctrine and to show nondiscriminatory practices,
then the burden of going forward would properly be upon it ir-
respective of the intervenors' contentions. On the other hand, in
the absence of an affirmative duty the APA precludes an agency
from presuming that the conduct of any person is unlawful or
improper, and therefore an evidentiary burden of going forward
with some evidence should lie with the intervenors. 4 It is this
rationale which the court misses and which justifies the assump-
tion the court made.
Additional grounds for assigning the burden to the interven-
ors may have been implicit in the court's assumption. Both the
Commission and the court seem to have been under the impres-
sion that the intervenors' knowledge of programming violations
was just as good as the applicant's. In fact, the court noted that
the intervenors had made a monitoring study covering one week's
broadcasts and had several witnesses willing to testify to discrim-
inatory practices. 5 When such evidence is within the grasp of
public intervenors there is little reason why they should not be
expected to sustain an initial burden of going forward.
In addition the allegations of misconduct or other improper
behavior may have evoked a feeling in the court that the inter-
venor must proceed with evidence so that the applicant can have
reasonable notice as to the charges he is expected to meet. But
the requirement of notice could as easily be met by compelling
the intervenor to make reasonably specific contentions in his
pleadings.
If it is accepted that the court is correct in its judgment that
intervenors bear some burden of going forward there are several
distinctions which may require a different result in the context
of nuclear facility licensing. Contentions raised before Atomic
Safety and Licensing Boards normally relate directly to the ulti-
mate issues before the Board, they are not allegations of miscon-
'See text accompanying note 21 supra.
"'See text accompanying note 32 supra,
_ 425 F.2d at 547-48.
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duct or unlawful behavior. Atomic Energy Commission regula-
tion requires that contentions be put forward in reasonably spe-
cific detail; therefore, there is no notice problem." Finally, in a
field as technical as that of nuclear energy there can be little
question that the applicant is unique in its position of knowledge.
Other administrative cases which have placed a burden upon
opponents or intervenors have done so for a variety of reasons.
In rate proceedings the burden shifts between the regulated
body and the opponent depending on whether the objection is
against a proposed change or against a change that has already
taken place but has yet to receive official sanction. In the pro-
posed rate-change situation there is an applicant who is the pro-
ponent of an order and, as such, has the burden of going forward
as well as the ultimate risk of nonpersuasion. Where the change
is in effect and is only questioned if an investigation is conducted
there is theoretically no applicant but only a complainant who,
in the context, is a proponent of an order vacating the change.57
The shift in the burden from the regulated body to the
intervenor-opponent is a result of the presumption of validity
given the increased or changed rate. If it is already in effect and
thus presumed valid, then the regulated body's initial burden is
ipso facto met, and the opponent must then present evidence to
overcome the presumption. Where a rate change is proposed the
regulated body must come forward with evidence in the first in-
stance before the opponent is required to do anything. Aside from
the existence of the presumption, the shift in the burden makes
little sense, since information in the hands of the parties is the
same regardless of the status of the rate. However, from a theoret-
ical standpoint the result is consistent with the APA, which
places the burden upon the proponent of a "rule" or "order.""S
5610 C.F.R. § 2.714 (1972).
"In IML Freight, Inc. v. United States, 30 Ad. L. Dec. 2d 712 (D. Utah 1972) the
motor carrier published rates that greatly exceeded the national classifications. The hear-
ing examiner ruled the intervenor-complainants had the burden of going forward and that
the burden had been met by a presumption of unreasonableness which attached to the
published rates because they so grossly exceeded the recommendations. The court upheld
the procedure as warranted. See also Terminal Charge, at Various Points, on Order Bill
of Lading Shipments, 315 i.C.C. 327 (1962), where the Commission indicated that where
a charge becomes effective prior to the institution of an investigation there is no changed
rate in issue. Accordingly, the proponent of the change does not have the burden of proof
and the complainant does.
75 U.S.C. § 556(d) (1970).
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In two related rate proceedings '" before the Federal Power
Commission, the burden of going forward with evidence as to
excessive contractual rates was placed on the FPC's regulatory
staff. The applicant in both cases, Seaboard Oil Company, had
sought a certificate authorizing it to sell natural gas in interstate
commerce, and the FPC staff had injected the issue of rates into
the proceeding. Although the ultimate risk of nonpersuasion was
on Seaboard, the Commission ruled that imposition of the burden
of going forward to justify the rates would present an impossible
task to any applicant. Since the staff failed to present 'sufficient
evidence to justify a different rate, the applications were
granted."
The rationale underlying the Commission's allocation of the
burden of going forward is far from clear. The Commission be-
lieved that the question of reasonable rates was an essential ele-
ment of the ultimate issue in the application, i.e., whether the
production and sale of natural gas in interstate commerce by
Seaboard would be consistent with the public interest, conveni-
ence, and necessity.' Since Seaboard had the risk of nonpersua-
sion with respect to the ultimate issue, logic would suggest that
it should also have had a burden to maintain with respect to the
question of reasonable rates. Undoubtedly rates that are not rea-
sonable cannot be in the public interest.
Conceivably the Commission might have attached a
presumption of reasonableness to the contract rates. If so, any
initial burden of going forward which the applicant had was auto-
matically satisfied and the burden of proof shifted to the staff to
overcome the presumption. Unfortunately, the Commission's
opinion reveals no such presumption. However, an indication
that it might have existed can be inferred from a dissenting opin-
ion which pointed out that there is a distinction between a rate
schedule submitted in evidence to support an application for a
certificate on the one hand, and, on the other, a rate schedule
filed by an already certified natural gas company.2 A presump-
tion of reasonableness, it would seem, might be appropriate in the
latter case. The dissent further stated that:
'Seaboard Oil Co., 19 F.P.C. 416 (1958); Transcontinental Gas Pipeline Corp., 20
F.P.C. 264 (1958).
"'Seaboard Oil Co., 19 F.P.C. 416, 420 (1958).
"Transcontinental Gas Pipeline Corp., 20 F.P.C. 264, 271 (1958).
"Seaboard Oil Co., 19 F.P.C. 416, 435 (1958) (dissenting opinion).
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There is no burden of proceeding which shifts to the Commission or
the Staff in a. . . licensing proceeding. Neither the Commission nor
our staff are proponents. Either the standards are met or they are
not."3
An alternative ground for the Commission's assignment of
the burden of going forward may be found in the skepticism of
several Commissioners who questioned the FPC's authority to
alter or set the initial contract rates between producers and pur-
chasers." However, even if the Commission lacked the authority,
such an inadequacy should not be dispositive of the allocation of
the burden of proof. Certainly rates set by contract could be
found unreasonable without the Commission, at the same time,
having to set reasonable rates. A finding by the Commission that
the contract rates were unreasonable would only mean that Sea-
board would have to renegotiate the rate and resubmit it to the
Commission with proof of reasonableness. 5 Thus, the question of
the allocation of the burden of going forward as to reasonable
rates is independent of the Commission's authority to fix such
rates. Since the reasonableness of a rate is germane to the inquiry
of public interest, convenience, and necessity the initial burden
of presenting some evidence as to reasonableness should have
been upon the applicant. By assigning the initial burden to the
staff the Commission was in error unless it entertained the pre-
sumption noted above.
6 6
There are several instances where a burden of going forward
has been placed upon the intervenor-opponent with apparent jus-
"Id. at 429 (dissenting opinion).
"Transcontinental Gas Pipeline Corp., 20 F.P.C. 264, 272 (1958), citing Phillip Petro-
leum Co. v. FPC, 258 F.2d 906 (10th Cir. 1958) where the court held that under the
Natural Gas Act the rate to be charged for natural gas is initially fixed by contract
between the seller and the purchaser and the Commission had no initial rate making
powers. An initial rate fixed by contract remained in effect unless and until it was changed
in a proceeding under section 5(a) of the Natural Gas Act. But see Atlantic Refinery Co.
v. Public Service Comm'n, 360 U.S. 378 (1959), in which the Court decided that the rate
level issue was a factor bearing on the public convenience and necessity. This opinion did
not overrule Seaboard because it did not address the respective burdens of proof. However,
it does support the inference that the applicant must come forward with evidence to show
that the contractual rate is in the public interest. Id. at 391-92.
"Transcontinental Gas Pipeline Corp., 20 F.P.C. 264, 290 (1958) (dissenting opinion).
It should not be impossible for the applicant to establish the reasonableness of his contrac-
tual rate, and, if found unreasonable, then renegotiate the rate with the producer before
reapplying for certificate.
"Seaboard Oil Co., 19 F.P.C. 416, 421-24 (1958). There are also overtones in the
opinion to the effect that consideration of a rate issue, although within the scope of the
ultimate issue, was too burdensome for the agency to undertake.
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tification even though normally the opponent has no such
burden.
In National Airlines, Inc. v. CAB"7 the CAB conducted an
adequacy-of-service investigation and ordered National to insti-
tute a Baltimore-Miami flight. As the proponent of a rule or order
the Board theoretically had the ultimate burden of showing that
the additional service was warranted, as well as the burden of
going forward. In spite of this it placed the burden of going for-
ward with evidence as to financial infeasibility upon National
and justified the imposition by saying that the Board was not
asking the airline to come forward with evidence on the entire
subject of economic feasibility, but only with evidence as to facts
particularly within the airline's knowledge.
National objected to the imposition as contrary to the APA
and sought review. The court upheld the agency's assignment of
the burden of going forward because, as the Board had indicated,
the knowledge was peculiar to the airline even though the agency
had access to some of the data. The court considered that
cities petitioning for adequate service and the Board would be un-
duly hampered by any requirement for overly detailed profit and
loss projections to establish the economic feasibility of adequate
service. This could not only intolerably protract adequacy of service
proceedings, but might create an insuperable barrier to petitioning
civic groups lacking both the relevant operating data and the assis-
tance of experts."
The rationale of the court is equally applicable to the place-
ment of the burden of going forward in a nuclear facility licensing
hearing. Where an applicant utility possesses particular knowl-
edge about the nuclear facility-as it must-imposition of the
burden of going forward upon a public intervenor will certainly
protract the proceedings and create an insuperable barrier to the
citizen organization which lacks the relevant data and the assis-
tance of experts."
In an FPC proceeding,7" the intervenor, American Louisiana
Pipe Line Company, sought to show that the application before
the Commission should be extended to cover Upper Michigan.
-7300 F.2d 711 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
"Id. at 715.
699 WIGMORE § 2486. See also Clarke v. United States, 101 F. Supp. 587, 594 (D.D.C.
1951).
'"American La. Pipe Line Co., 19 F.P.C. 1 (1958).
1974
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The applicant had purposefully excluded the area, intending to
apply for coverage of the area in the future. The intervenor sought
to prove its case solely by cross-examination, but the Commis-
sion, in granting the certificate as originally applied for, held that
American Louisiana could not sustain its contention in that man-
ner and should have submitted direct evidence as requested.
The burden of going forward was placed upon American
Louisiana because its contention was outside the scope of whether
the applicant could demonstrate that the public interest, conven-
ience, and necessity required an extension of service into the re-
gion it had selected. The intervenor raised an issue which accord-
ing to the Commission was unrelated to the ultimate issue in-
volved. The peninsula was specifically excluded from the applica-
tion, and intervenors, by seeking to enlarge the area of service,
.became a proponent of an order with at least a burden of going
forward if not the risk of nonpersuasion.7'
In Hall v. FCC72 the applicant for modification of a construc-
tion permit relied upon an agency study of reception probabilities
to show that reception would be reduced unless its permit were
modified. The opponent contended that since the study was re-
lated to a normal area, and the area in which the applicant oper-
ated might be abnormal, the applicant had the burden of proving
the normality of its broadcast area. The court held, however, that
the opponent must prove the area to be abnormal.
Upon first analysis it appears that the burden of going for-
ward with initial evidence in regard to the issue of normality was
placed on the opponent. But this is incorrect. The applicant had
the initial burden of going forward, and the risk of nonpersuasion;
but under the circumstances the court was willing to entertain a
presumption that the region was normal. This presumption was
sufficient to establish a prima facie case and cast the burden of
producing rebuttal evidence on the opponent.73
7See Ashworth Transfer, Inc. v. United States, 27 Ad. L. Dec. 2d 494 (D. Utah 1970),
where the court placed the burden of proof on the intervenors to demonstrate that pro-
posed restrictions on a certificate were in the public interest. The restrictions were outside
the scope of the issues considered in granting certificate of public convenience and
necessity.
126 Ad. L. Dec. 2d 419 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
7"9 WIGMORE § 2488(a). This case has implications for issues attacking the interim
criteria for emergency core cooling systems. If a presumption is raised by an applicant's
compliance with the criteria then the burden shifts to the intervenor to come forward with
special circumstances demonstrating why the criteria are inapplicable.
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It is evident, then, that a burden of going forward can be
imposed justifiably upon the intervenor-opponent in some instan-
ces, but not without regard to the circumstances and issues in-
volved. When an intervenor becomes a proponent of a rule or
order either by statute or because the issues it raises fall outside
the scope of those which are expected to be or are normally raised
therein, then an initial burden of going forward can be properly
placed upon the intervenor. Likewise when an intervenor-
opponent has peculiar knowledge, or where the commission or
court is willing to entertain a presumption, the intervenor may
have an initial burden to sustain. The question remains whether
a public interest intervenor raising contentions directly related to
and circumscribed by the ultimate factual issues involved should
have any initial burden except in those instances noted above, or
whether an applicant should have the burden of going forward
with respect to those issues. Judicial and administrative bodies
have seldom, and then only indirectly, placed this burden upon
the applicant.
B. Burden of Going Forward on Applicant
The issue of whether an intervenor has any burden to sustain
arose obliquely in Deep South Broadcasting Co. v. FCC.74 There
the Commission authorized the applicant to increase its broad-
casting power over the objections of the intervenor, Deep South.
The applicant had not been required to show that the increase in
power would have no deleterious impact upon future assignments
to other stations. On appeal the Commission attempted to ration-
alize the shortcoming by claiming that Deep South could have
done nothing in a hearing, or in meting evidence brought for-
ward by the applicant that would have altered the result reached.
The Commission also claimed that its review board had made an
"independent evaluation" of the impact of the power increase,
and subsequently had indicated its willingness to hear any chatc
lenge to the evaluation's accuracy. Since Deep South had failed
to ask the review board to reopen the hearings at that time, the
Commission argued that the intervenor should not be heard to
complain on appeal.75
The court rejected the attempted rationalization stating that
neither the Commission's "independent evaluation" or its will-
'1347 F.2d 459 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
'I1d. at 464.
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
ingness to reopen the proceeding had the effect of shifting the
burden of proof on a controlling issue from the applicant to the
intervenor, who theoretically begins with no burden at all.7" The
court explained that the intervenor was not an applicant and
had no burden of proof of any kind on this issue either affirmative
or negative. It was entitled to see what evidence [the applicant]
could or would bring forward on that issue, and to test it by cross-
examination or to counter it by evidence of its own."
The court believed that since the question of the impact of
the power increase was directly related to the ultimate issue of
whether the increase would be in the public interest, the appli-
cant should have both the burden of going forward and the ulti-
mate risk of nonpersuasion.
In spite of the unconditional language appearing in the opin-
ion the decision is not dispositive of the allocation of the burden
of going forward with regard to issues raised by an intervenor
because the issue before the court was initially raised by a mem-
ber of the licensing board. Thereafter, the issue was adopted and
pursued by the intervenor, but it is apparent that the court re-
garded the question as one raised by the Commission.78
In another rate proceeding,7" Union Oil Company of Califor-
7 d. at 464 n.3. The court stated that:
It is said that Deep South should not now be heard to complain because it
did not ask the Board to reopen the hearings at that time. But Deep South
was not an applicant for a licensing privilege, nor was there any burden of
proof on it to establish that WKTG's application should be denied. It was
entitled to lay before the Commission, as it did, alternative contentions that
WKTG had not sustained its burden of proof as to the merits of its applica-
tion, and that the application should be denied; or that the procedure fol-
lowed in assembling the quantum of proof on behalf of the application had
been so irregular that, if the Commission was not disposed to deny the
application without more, it should remand the application to a hearing




71The court relied upon section 309(e) of the Communications Act of 1934 which
provided that:
The burden of proceeding with the introduction of evidence and the burden
of proof shall be upon the applicant, except that with respect to any issue
presented in a petition to deny or a petition to enlarge the issues, such
burdens shall be as determined by the Commission.
47 U.S.C. § 309(e) (Supp. 1974). If the court had viewed the issue as raised by the
intervenor then it would have referred to the discretionary authority vested in the Com-
mission by statute to assign the burdens of proof. Instead the court found that the statute
required both burdens be placed upon the applicant.
7In re Union Oil Co.. 16 F.P.C. 100 (1956).
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nia applied for a rate increase on the sale of natural gas. 0 Follow-
ing the applicant's presentation intervenors waived cross-
examination and moved to dismiss the application because Union
Oil had failed to produce evidence that the increased rates were
no higher than necessary to encourage exploration for and pro-
duction of known and future gas reserves. The Commission gave
Union Oil further time to adduce evidence and, upon its failure
to do so, held that the applicants had failed to submit evidence
on which it could be determined as a matter of law that the rates
were just and reasonable.8"
The Commission stated that the applicant had the burden
of proving that the proposed rate increase was just and reasona-
ble, and the discharge of that burden must be affirmative, con-
crete, and persuasive. s2 Further,
[n]o burden of proof rests with intervenors or the staff to present
negative evidence that the increased rate is unreasonable, for until
the applicant has presented a prima facie case opposing parties have
no burden of going forward. 3
In Railway Express Agency, Inc., 4 the Civil Aeronautics
Board instituted an investigation of the tariff schedule by which
REA proposed to increase its charges. The burden of going for-
ward was placed upon REA to show that the proposed rate was
just and reasonable because the proponent had within its posses-
sion the major portion of the evidence supporting the charge,
"'The distinction between seeking a rate increase and attacking an existing rate
should be remembered. See text accompanying note 57 supra. In this case Union Oil is
the proponent of an order permitting it to raise its rates on the sale of natural gas.
"16 F.P.C. at 113.
"Id. at 111, citing In re Mississippi River Fuel Corp., 2 F.P.C. 170, aff'd 121 F.2d 159
(8th Cir. 1941).
'1d. See also Colorado-Arizona-California Express, Inc. v. United States, 224 F.
Supp. 894 (D. Colo. 1963), where the Interstate Commerce Commission denied a carrier's
application for a certificate because the applicant had failed to establish that present and
future public convenience and necessity required the grant of the application, and had
failed to establish its fitness, willingness, and ability to properly conduct the proposed
operation. In affirming the Commission's action the court held that the applicant had a
burden of proof to show inadequate service, and that burden cannot be met by inferences
drawn from failures of protesting carriers to prosecute their cause. See also Pacific Inter-
mountain Express Co., 8 Ad. L. Dec. 2d 235 (I.C.C. 1958) where the Commission, denying
the merger application because applicant had failed to sustain its burden of proof, stated:
Nor are we relieved of this application by the fact that many of the compet-
ing carriers refrained from intervening and introducing evidence . . . . The
burden is upon applicants to submit the necessary evidence . ...
Id. at 237.
118 Ad. L. Dec. 2d 543 (C.A.B. 1958).
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evidence which was not readily available to other parties."5 The
Board concluded that to place such an onus upon an opponent
would create a heavy obstacle in its path by requiring it to make
an initial presentation on the basis of evidence readily available
only to the proponent. Moreover, substantial delay to the admin-
istrative process would ensue if the opponent were forced to
gather evidence sufficient to support a prima facie case."8
The ICC easily disposed of intervenors' numerous conten-
tions in Atlanta-New Orleans Motor Freight Co. v. United
States. 7 There M.R. & R. Trucking Company made application
to extend its motor common carrier service by annexing approxi-
mately 150 shipping points, all to be serviced from Atlanta. At
the hearing 10 protesting intervenors contended that the appli-
cant could not and did not show need for improved service with
respect to each and every one of the points involved. The appli-
cant did offer direct testimony relating to 22 of the points, and
this showing convinced the Commission that the proposed service
was required by the present and future public convenience and
necessity.
On judicial review intervenors alleged that the certificate
was granted without being supported by substantial evidence.
The court, however, refused to impose the burden of presenting
direct evidence with respect to all of the points upon the appli-
cant. Instead the evidence which was introduced was sufficient
to support a presumption of need at other points within the area
as to which no specific testimony was offered.8" The inference
shifted the burden to the intervenors who, in order to rebut it,
were required to demonstrate by direct evidence that the public
convenience and necessity did not require the proposed opera-
tions of the applicant.
The applicant had the initial burden of going forward in the
face of intervenors' contentions, but because of an interest in
Id. at 545. The attitude of the CAB toward a rate increase is somewhat different than
that of the FPC. In an FPC investigation the increased rate has a presumption of validity
with the consequence that the opponent has the burden of proof. The CAB views its
investigation as an application for a rate increase with no presumption attached.
"The dissenting Board members argued that the CAB, as a proponent of an order
rescinding the charges, should have the burden of establishing a prima facie case before
shifting the burden to REA.




administrative efficiency, its burden was deemed satisfied by a
rebuttable presumption.":
None of the foregoing decisions placing a burden of going
forward upon an applicant squarely faced the question of the
apportionment of this burden in instances where an intervenor
raised contentions. In Deep South the language strongly suggests
that there would be no burden whatsoever upon the intervenor,
but the court's decision related solely to an issue raised initially
by the licensing board and considered important by it. In the
remainder of the cases in which the applicant was found to have
a burden of initially presenting evidence, the court or administra-
tive body, in effect, merely held that the applicant had the bur-
den of going forward on issues normally involved in a licensing
hearing even without the presence of intervenors."' Logically the
language and rationale of these cases would support the conclu-
sion that if an intervenor raises a contention, which contention
is or would be considered by the board to be part of the appli-
cant's case even without intervention, then the applicant should
have the initial burden of going forward with evidence. But this
conclusion is not the one best suited to the efficient conduct of
administrative proceedings, nor is it generally applicable to all
contentions raised by an intervenor or all circumstances in which
administrative agencies function.
Certain rate cases illustrate the third approach which admin-
istrative agencies have adopted toward the apportionment of the
burden of going forward.
C. Burden of Going Forward Immaterial
Terminal Charge, at Various Points, on Order Bills of Lading
Shipments"' involved an investigation of existing motor carrier
"Id. A petition for leave to intervene in proceedings before the Interstate Commerce
Commission must set forth "the grounds of the proposed intervention, the position and
interest of the petitioner in the proceeding, and whether petitioner's position is in support
of or in opposition to the relief sought." 49 C.F.R. § 1100.72 (1974). Under the regulation,
although the opinion of the court does not mention it, intervenors must have raised
contentions with regard to each one of the points in question.
"'"In In re Union Oil Co., 16 F.P.C. 100 (1956) the applicant had the burden of going
forward on the issue of just and reasonable rates irrespective of the intervenor's presence.
Similarly, Colorado-Arizona-California Express, Inc. v. United States, 224 F. Supp. 894
(D. Colo. 1963), Pacific Intermountain Express Co., 8 Ad. L. Dec. 2d 235 (I.C.C. 1958),
and Atlanta-New Orleans Motor Freight, 197 F. Supp. 364 (N.D. Ga. 1961), were all cases
involving issues normal to the administrative inquiry and not regarded as contentions
placed in issue by intervenors.
"315 I.C.C. 327 (1962).
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charges by the Interstate Commerce Commission. Because there
was no changed rate in issue, the proponents of the existing rate
did not have the burden of proof; instead the protesting interven-
ors as proponents of an order changing the rate had the burden.
The Commission, considering the case important because of
the burden of proof issue, cautioned that the allocation of the
burden of proof was primarily a rule of evidence designed to in-
sure orderly procedure; but if viewed solely in quantitative terms,
it soon would become master of the administrative process rather
than the servant.
The Commission found that the intervenors had failed to
establish that the charges were unlawful even though they had
submitted as much evidence as could reasonably be expected in
light of information available to them. Nevertheless, the Com-
mission held that the existing charge was unreasonable because
the carriers had failed to produce evidence justifying the charges
on the basis of facts peculiarly within their knowledge. This seem-
ingly injudicious regard for the consequences of bearing the bur-
den of proof was brought about because the Commission was
confronted with a situation where identical rates in other pro-
ceedings had been found unreasonable. If the rates in Terminal
Charge had been permitted to stand simply because the inter-
venor had failed to meet its burden of proof there would be an
irrational and unacceptable inconsistency. Thus the Commission
explained that even if the intervenor had offered no evidence at
all, the Commission as protector of the public interest would have
been obliged to supplement the record to determine if the rates
were reasonable.
Although the ICC in Terminal Charge did not explicitly so
indicate, it seemed to regard the administrative hearing as funda-
mentally different from the ordinary civil litigation between two
private parties. According to the Commission the agency's deter-
mination could not be based upon who proved what by a prepon-
derance of the evidence, or by which party came forward with
evidence to establish a prima facie case. Rather, as the protector
of the public interest, it had the affirmative duty to search out
all the evidence as well as draw upon its own technical expertise
before rendering a decision. In essence, if the Commission's judg-
ment is correct, the question of who has the burden of going
forward may be irrelevant in the administrative process except in
terms of orderly procedure and the public interest. If an agency
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believes that imposition of the burden upon an intervenor would
best assist the Commission in protecting the public interest, then
according to the reasoning in Terminal Charge it may do so. 2
The FPC adopted a similar approach towards the burden of
going forward in Area Rate Proceeding" when it ordered simulta-
neous written presentation of direct cases by all parties including
intervenors, followed by simultaneous presentation of rebuttal
evidence. After considering intervenors' motion to revise the
schedule to permit them to present their direct cases after the
staff and respondent had presented theirs, the Commission
remarked that
[it] unquestionably [had] the authority in discharging its duties
to establish an appropriate hearing procedure. It has done so in this
proceeding. Whether or not the staff or any of the parties has the
burden of proof or the burden of going forward in no wise calls for
any change in the requirement that simultaneous direct presenta-
tions be made."
The intervenors contended that fair procedure dictated that they
be allowed to see the respondent's direct case before presenting
their own because they needed more time. They also argued that
simultaneous submission of direct evidence would be inefficient
as there was bound to be much duplication by staff and interven-
ors or staff and applicant. Rejecting these contentions, the Com-
mission found the approach to be the fairest and most expeditious
means of conducting the proceeding.
5
11Id. See also Great Northern Ry. Discontinuance of Service, 307 I.C.C. 59 (1y59),
where the hearing examiner, after considering carrier's request that the burden of proof
should be upon the parties complaining that public convenience and necessity required
continuation of service, ruled that the carrier seeking to abandon passenger s~vice must
proceed with the presentation of evidence. Noting that the carrier had not been prejudiced
by the procedure, the Commission declined to decide who had the burden of proof in
investigation proceedings and stated:
In any event, the question is of more theoretical than practical importance
... . Regardless of where the burden of proof lies, a carrier subject to our
regulation is expected to aid in the disposition of proceedings to which it is
a party by making available all pertinent facts within its knowledge.
Id. at 61.
930 F.P.C. 512 (1963).
"Id. at 512.
"'See also Midwestern Gas Transmission Co., 29 F.P.C. 723 (1963), where the inter-
venor in a rate proceeding requested that the presiding examiner follow a procedure
whereby the cases in chief of the proponents would be served upon all parties prior to the
cases in chief of any intervenors. The presiding officer declined, adopting a plan requiring
intervenors to proceed first. On review the Commission upheld the examiner's procedure
stating that
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Thus far the decisions analyzed have disclosed three alterna-
tive approaches toward the apportionment of the burden of proof.
In general there seems to be no consistent formula applied by
either administrative or judicial bodies. As an outsider to the
numerous varieties of agency adjudicatory hearings, one should
hesitate to conclude that the agencies and courts approach the
apportionment of the burden on an ad hoc basis. Perhaps no
comprehensive scheme can or should be developed. Arguably the
kinds of privileges applied for, whether they be a motor carrier's
certificate, a rate increase, renewal of a broadcast license, or con-
struction permit, are dissimilar enough to justify a different ap-
proach by each agency.
If the analysis of the three alternatives has not provided a
consistent approach, it has at least imparted a sense that admin-
istrative hearings are not procedurally similar to two-party civil
litigation. The ultimate issue before a licensing board is not who
wins or loses, but, more importantly, whether grant of the privi-
lege will best serve the public interest. And thus the agency's
apportionment of the burdens of proof becomes less a substantive
rule with legal significance in terms of dismissal or directing a
verdict and more a procedural rule serving the interests of the
administrative body and the public.
In the abstract the question of who has the burden of going
forward, or even the risk of nonpersuasion with regard to issues
raised by an intervenor, might and probably should be immater-
ial, as suggested by the third alternative. And if the allocation is
in the first instance a neutral proposition, then perhaps the
agency should have the discretion to assign the burdens in such
a way as to facilitate its statutory duty. In fact, there is one
federal agency with statutory authority to adopt a discretionary
approach. Section 309(e) of the Communications Act of 1934 pro-
vides:
Any hearing subsequently held upon such application shall be a full
hearing in which the applicant and all other parties in interest shall
be permitted to participate. The burden of proceeding with the in-
troduction of evidence and the burden of proof shall be upon the
considerations of who may ultimately bear the burden of proof in these
proceedings have little bearing on the real problem confronting the Exam-
iner, i.e., establishing a schedule which most nearly balances the needs and
conveniences of the parties against the interests of expedition.
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applicant, except that with respect to any issue presented by a peti-
tion to deny or a petition to enlarge the issues, such burdens shall
be as determined by the Commission."
The legislative decision to give the Federal Communications
Commission this discretion was not without reference to practical
experience. Predecessor sections of section 309(e) had categori-
cally stated that with respect to issues set forth in protest and not
adopted or specified by the Commission, both the burden of going
forward and the ultimate burden of proof would be on the protes-
tant. 7 Although the legislative history is unclear, the categorical
approach seems to have been abandoned because of a legislative
feeling that it was sometimes difficult for a legitimate opponent
to sustain the burdens and that the Commission required the
flexibility to effectively ascertain the public interest."
Now that courts have begun to recognize that administrative
agencies can no longer rely solely upon the evidence presented by
the parties, but instead must affirmatively search out all aspects
relevant to the public interest," the flexibility authorized by sec-
tion 309(e) and assumed by other agencies is essential. It is also
essential, when the public interest is at stake, to impose upon all
parties participating in the administrative proceeding a duty to
make available all pertinent facts within their knowledge ir-
respective of any burden of proof.""
Determination of the order in which disclosure of the perti-
nent facts is made should rest with the agency, but its discretion
should not be exercised arbitrarily, frivolously, or with malice
toward any party. Since by statute all parties participate with
equal right, the allocation should be made, as Wigmore sug-
"47 U.S.C. § 309(e) (Supp. 1974).
1
7Id. § 309(c) (1956). See Carroll Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 258 F.2d 440 (D.C. Cir.
1958), where a competitor of an applicant for a broadcasting license alleged that the grant
of a license would be adverse to the public interest because it would impair his (the
competitor's) economic position. Although the burden of proof issue was not squarely
presented, the court found that the intervenor had the burden of showing potential eco-
nomic injury and that it was "certainly a heavy burden." Id. at 444. At the time section
309(d) of the Communications Act placed both burdens of proof upon the protestant.
However, the result is also justified because the facts relevant to a competitor's economic
vulnerability are peculiarly within the control of the competitor.
'S. REP. No. 690, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, 4 (1959). Ironically Clay T. Whitehead,
director of the White House Office of Telecommunications Policy, recently proposed legis-
lation which seeks to reinstate the burden of proof upon the challenger in a license renewal
hearing, as reported in the Chicago Tribune, March 14, 1972.
"See Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608, 620 (2d Cir. 1965).
'See cases cited note 92 supra.
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gested, on the basis of broad considerations of policy.'"'
An agency should consider numerous facts when making its
determination, not the least important of which is that the appli-
cant is asking the public to grant it a privilege. Important also is
the nature of the party and of the regulated subject matter. Addi-
tional consideration should focus upon the particular party's ac-
cess to relevant information, and his ability to process facts and
hire competent expert witnesses. Administrative efficiency, while
not paramount, should also receive attention.
Thus in proceedings before the Atomic Energy Commission,
the hearing examiner should be vested with the discretion to
assign the burdens of proof as considerations of policy dictate.
V. ALLOCATION OF THE BURDENS OF PROOF IN AEC PROCEEDINGS
Before analyzing the considerations relevant to the question
of whether a public interest intervenor should have a burden of
going forward or even the ultimate burden of persuasion, it is best
to understand the procedure that the Commission has provided
for intervention. Under the applicable rules of practice interven-
tion is only permitted when the prospective intervenor is able to
set forth with particularity both the facts pertaining to his inter-
est and the basis for his contentions with regard to each aspect
on which he desires to intervene.'"2
Once intervention is permitted, an intervenor is entitled to
utilize the discovery devices available to gather facts relevant to
the contentions raised. 03 Upon the discovery of new information
which was not previously available to the intervenor, it has been
the Commission's policy to permit amendments to the
contentions.
Historically, public interest intervenors in each AEC licens-
ing proceeding have presented to the licensing board an average
of 150 contentions. In the course of discovery a substantial num-
ber of these are normally explained to the intervenor's satisfac-
'9 WIGMORE § 2488(a).
.1210 C.F.R. § 2.714 (1973). The new regulations require that the petition to intervene
shall set forth the interests of the petitioner in the proceeding, how that interest may be
affected by Commission's action, and other contentions including the facts and reasons
why he should be permitted to intervene. The petition must be accompanied by support-
ing affidavits setting forth with particularity both the facts pertaining to his interest and
the basis for his contentions with regard to each aspect on which he desires to intervene.
""The anomaly has been pointed out previously that the contentions have to be
supported initially, otherwise intervention is denied. 10 C.F.R. § 2.714 (1973).
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tion. The remaining contentions are again given to the licensing
board for a determination of relevancy and merit. After hearing
argument from each of the parties, the board decides whether the
contentions will become issues in the licensing hearing. The num-
ber of contentions surviving this prehearing process is usually no
more than 20.
Almost invariably the issues raised by the intervenor relate
directly to the ultimate findings of fact that the board must make
before granting or denying a license. For example, an intervenor's
contention might postulate a steam line rupture leading eventu-
ally to a serious accident. There can be no question that the
steam line is adequately constructed and is within the sphere of
the required finding of safety. In most instances intervenors sim-
ply deny that the applicant has complied with an explicit AEC
standard which must be met before a license can be issued. This,
then, is the context in which the various policy considerations
must be analyzed and balanced.
Applicants eager to begin constructing or operating a nuclear
facility vigorously argue that fairness and administrative effi-
ciency require that some burden of going forward be placed upon
intervenors. They contend that without imposing some eviden-
tiary burden there is no way to protect the administrative process
or the applicant from frivolous contentions contrived to delay the
licensing of a multimillion dollar facility. The floodgate argu-
ment, used to bar public intervenors so many times in the past,
is here resurrected once again.104
Viscerally, one might be inclined to sympathize with the
applicant. Perhaps a modest burden should be imposed upon a
public intervenor to show that his claims have merit. Otherwise,
if they are frivolous, the applicant and the agency will suffer
needless delay and expense.""5 There are, however, countervailing
considerations.
In order to obtain permission to utilize special nuclear mate-
rial, with all of its inherent hazards, an applicant must demon-
'"'In Church of Christ, Judge Burger gave short shrift to the floodgate argument raised
against allowing intervention. He noted that the prohibitive cost of participating in litiga-
tion would serve to discourage the bringing of frivolous claims.
'"Giving the intervenor the benefit of the doubt for the moment, its original petition
to intervene is prepared without the benefit of discovery. Consequently some of the con-
tentions will be well founded while others may be based upon a misunderstanding. How-
ever, once intervention is granted and discovery proceeds, the responsible intervenor will
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strate to the satisfaction of the Commission that the proposed
facility meets all of the requirements of the Atomic Energy Act
as well as the Commission's regulations. These requirements in-
clude the ultimate findings that must be made, as well as detailed
design and operational criteria.106 The applicant, as the propo-
nent of an order granting the license, must bear the risk of non-
persuasion on these issues and the burden of presenting sufficient
evidence to establish a prima facie case. Presumably, absent in-
tervention or a contested proceeding, the applicant could sustain
this burden solely with the introduction of documentary evidence
addressing the applicable standards and criteria.""
After viewing the applicant's evidence, the board then makes
findings on the ultimate issues, e.g., the plant has been designed
and constructed in accordance with the Commission's rules and
regulations; the applicant is technically and financially qualified;
and there is reasonable assurance that the facility can be oper-
ated without endangering the health and safety of the public.
As noted earlier, an intervenor's contentions will frequently
deny an applicant's compliance with certain specific criteria, cri-
teria on which the applicant must make a prima facie showing
irrespective of the intervenor's presence. In such a case the inter-
venor has done nothing more than place the parties and the board
on notice that it intends to challenge the applicant's evidence and
rebut it if his fears are not assuaged or if he considers it necessary.
To impose any initial burden upon an intervenor when the Com-
mission's own criteria are in question makes little sense and can
result only in delay and inefficiency.
Those contentions which do not call into question the appli-
narrow its contentions, making them more accurate and more specific. If discovery works
properly, i.e., if there is a free interchange of information between all parties, then those
contentions based upon a misunderstanding will be satisfied and laid aside. A serious
intervenor should not wish to jeopardize his valid claims by alienating the board with
frivolous ones.
:"610 C.F.R. §§ 50.55-.55(a), .57 (1973).
"'7Commission regulation requires an applicant to prepare a multivolume Final Safety
Analysis Report (F.S.A.R., Preliminary Safety Report for a construction license) and draft
a Detailed Environmental Statement covering all aspects of the facility's compliance with
design and construction standards and all deleterious effects upon the environment. These
documents form the basis of the applicant's evidence and if unchallenged might be suffi-
cient to establish a prima facie case. 10 C.F.R. §§ 2.743(g), 60.34(a), (b) (1973). Section
2239 seems to contemplate just such a result where the Commission can make the requisite
findings upon an operational license application without a hearing absent a protest by any
person whose interest may be affected. 42 U.S.C. § 2239 (1970).
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cant's compliance with existing specific criteria but are neverthe-
less directly related to an ultimate finding do nothing more than
focus upon deficiencies in the applicant's case. If, for example,
the applicant must prove that his plant is safe, then he must
convince the board by direct evidence, by inference, or whatever,
that every aspect of the facility is safe. It is of course beyond the
mortal competence of the applicant to show that his plant is
universally safe; however, when licensing the use of such inher-
ently hazardous material, the board should not compromise the
goal or the public interest. It should not permit the applicant to
escape his duty when deficiencies in his case are revealed."" If the
intervenor's issue relates to safety, or any other required finding,
then as part of the whole it is legitimately a component of the
applicant's case. As such, the applicant must meet the specific
issue in order to establish its prima facie case or suffer an unfavor-
able finding on the ultimate or general issue. Administrative
economy would dictate that the issue should be met by the appli-
cant at the same time it comes forward with evidence with respect
to other specific issues in the proceeding.
Ideally, the question of who should come forward with evi-
dence in an administrative hearing should have no quantitative
legal significance for any of the parties. Once all the evidence is
before the board it is sufficient that a determination whether the
grant of a license would be in the public interest can be made. If
an intervenor is to have any initial burden with regard to issues
related to the ultimate findings, neither the applicant nor the
Commission should be free to ignore such issues simply because
the intervenor fails to establish a prima facie case.'10 Nuclear
energy is so hazardous that no question about safety ought to
remain unresolved. The applicant and the Commission have a
duty to the public to explore every conceivable hazard, every
perceived problem, without imposing legal standards that oper-
ate to foreclose inquiry.
The risk of litigating frivolous issues is considerably lessened
by the Commission's prehearing procedure. It is arguable that,
because the board makes a judgment as to the merit of an issue
before permitting it to be litigated, it has, in effect, adopted the
issue, and the intervenor need not establish a prima facie case at
all.
"See Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1118 (D.C. Cir.
1971).
'See text accompanying note 92 supra.
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The danger posed by procedural traps inherent in requiring
an intervenor to come forward and establish a prima facie case is
greatly enhanced in a field as technical as nuclear engineering. A
facility is designed and built by an applicant with all of its multi-
farious experts. The Commission with its expert regulatory staff
reviews the design and monitors the construction. But a public
intervenor with limited resources and limited expertise is severely
handicapped in the gathering and processing of information.
The information relevant to the intervenor's contentions is
peculiarly in the hands of an applicant. With its vast resources
and abundance of experts, the imposition of the burden of going
forward upon an electrical utility will create slight inconvenience.
Any hardship would be miniscule when compared with the risk
which would be created by placing an evidentiary burden upon
an intervenor.
Availability of information has frequently been used to deter-
mine the placement of the burden of going forward. When a party
is specially or peculiarly in possession of information relevant to
the proceeding, then it has, and rightfully should bear, the bur-
den of initially coming forward with evidence on the issue."
When it is recognized that a party lacks the expertise and the
resources to effectively establish a prima facie case, then no ini-
tial burden should be placed upon it."'
Congress provided for public participation in nuclear facility
licensing proceedings primarily because it wanted local citizens
to be informed about the awesome and hazardous force placed in
the midst of their community. Secondly, legislators wished to
insure that the agency would be accountable to the public for its
actions. Both of these reasons argue in favor of full discussion of
all the issues raised irrespective of any burden of going forward.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the placement of the burden of going forward
in administrative proceedings is initially a neutral factor whose
eventual assignment depends ultimately upon considerations of
policy. A public interest intervenor participating in atomic en-
ergy litigation is under a duty to present all of the information
within its possession to the licensing board. But because of its role
""9 WIGMORE § 2486.
'"National Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 300 F.2d 711 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
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in the proceedings and because of its relative lack of information
and expertise, the attention given the intervenor's issues should
not depend upon whether he is able to establish a prima facie
case. All of the issues raised should be fully explored and resolved
to the satisfaction of all the parties. On balance, it would seem
that the most efficient approach would be to have the applicant
proceed first with regard to all the issues raised in the proceeding,
with the intervenor following.

